****** - Verified Buyer
4.5
A British historian Evan Mawdsley is no Macaulay, but his new account of the the Second World War is refreshing. He wrote a neat book which should receive attention as the first non-Eurocentric single-volume history of the War. Every ten years or so, a good tome on the Second World War comes out. One might think of "A War To Be Won" by Murray and Millett or "The Second World War" by John Keegan, or "History of the Second World War" by Sir Basil Liddell Hart. I think Evan Mawdsley's book belongs to the same class of books. His book is a solid "Grand Strategic" narrative. He focuses more on the geo-political and geo-strategic dimensions, rather than details and descriptions of battles. He has big and controversial ideas. Most importantly, it asks questions -- for example: "When did the World War II begin? or "What was the war about?" which seem like simple questions, until you start thinking about it.One of his central ideas is that the Second World War started in July 1937. It is an interesting idea with which I disagree. He refers, of course, to the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 when the Japanese Kwantung Army units near Beijing were fired upon by the Chinese National Revolutionary Army. The incident was small, but by the end of July 1937 there was a full scale war between the Chinese and the Japanese. I think the author is wrong here. Why? Well, one can start by asking a simple question: "What the Japanese Army was doing in China in 1937?" Japan throughout the 1930s was aspiring to take first China and then the whole of the Far East, as they call it The Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We can go back to the Mukden Incident -- a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for invading the northern part of China known as Manchuria in 1931. One can go even more back in time, perhaps to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 or Mongol conquests: opportunities are endless.He makes some controversial claims concerning Hitler's invasion in Russia. Why did Germany invade Russia in June 1941? According to Mawdsley, "the German high command did not have a better route out of its strategic impasse. Britain had not surrendered, and its forces were recovering from the disaster in Flanders. However negatively the Germans assessed the USSR, the Red Army could be expected to grow stronger over time. Although for the moment Russia willingly provided the Reich with necessary resources, Stalin could cut the flow at any time. [here comes the kicker] Not attacking the USSR was in reality as dangerous an option as operation BARBAROSSA. " I think Mawdsley is on the wrong track here resurrecting these old moth-eaten ideas of pre-emptive war. These "reasons" resemble false and confusing justifications Hitler himself offered to the perplexed Germans. After talking fearsomely of Russia's strength, Hitler finally justified the invasion by announcing her weakness.I rather disagree with "strategic impasse". Germany was led by an inevitable and fatal logic to desire first a peaceful and then a warlike mastery of Europe. Anglo-Soviet accord would have been the only way to counter that threat. But the alliance didn't take place [let's not forget that Soviet attempts to form an anti-Fascist alliance were continually rebuffed until Stalin saw the only way forward - a non-aggression pact with Germany]. In this Hitler saw the opportunity to attack Russia. He went to war gladly because he thought he could easily win it.If Britain wanted to keep Russia out of Europe, Hitler wanted to destroy it to gain Lebensraum. The western politicians, except Churchill, probably wouldn't mind if he did. But Hitler didn't know Russia at all, he didn't know it would be a tough opponent. Hitler had crackpot geopolitical ideas which were a fusion between vulgar version of Mackinder, the "Drang nach Osten", and the racial superiority. This compote was rubbish and Hitler passionately believed in the rubbish which filled head. However the German drive to Mastery of Europe was real and serious. Mawdsley's alleged German "strategic impasse" could only be true in a British-centric world, in which Hitler's main goal was to come to terms with Great Britain. I don't see it. As far as "danger of not attacking the USSR", Hitler by the end of June 1940 had a more complete domination of Europe than Napoleon ever had and at a trivial expenditure of men and munitions. He wasn't in danger at all. I disagree with the author on key issues, but I still think this is a darn good history. The book is a thought-provoking and vivid account. I recommend it.
